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 Even though the majority of the work on this thesis was completed in the 
past school year, the subject has interested me long before. I found it fascinating 
how foreign policy and international interactions in today’s world are often 
dominated by atomic weapons. Who has them? Who is trying to build them? Will 
they use them? I decided to research exactly when this aspect of our modern society 
became such an influence. I started with the creation of the bomb and the 
Manhattan Project and became absorbed in all aspects of the topic. I was fortunate 
enough to be able to expand my research and produce this thesis. 
 The first chapter of this thesis sets the stage for the war leading up to the 
bomb. The majority of this chapter is a review of the traditional facts of World War 
II but from the perspective of historical significance to the atomic bomb. While this 
chapter may be tedious to World War II and atomic experts, it is critical for 
historiographical context for the analysis in the chapters that follow it. 
 The second chapter focuses on the invasion plans being devised during the 
spring and summer of 1945. This invasion, Codename Downfall, would be the 
primary alternative to the atomic bomb, upon its completion. This chapter also 
begins the analysis of Truman’s decision-making process, by looking at what types 
of information he was given and who gave it to him. 
 Chapter three describes the use of the atomic bombs. In addition to 
furthering the analysis of Truman’s choice, this chapter discusses the physical 
effects of the bomb. It includes primary source accounts from those who witnessed 
	
	 4	
the explosion and the aftermath, detailing the horrors of the new weaponry and the 
shock of its impact. 
 Chapter four calls President Truman’s traditional justification for his use of 
the bomb into question. Ending the war quickly may have been Truman’s primary 
motivating factor, but there is significant evidence that multiple additional factors 
were influential, including anti-Japanese sentiments and worries over communist 
Russia. 
 I readily admit that there is more to learn about this subject and that the 
question I chose to answer is nearly impossible to answer decisively. It is very 
nearly impossible to conclusively determine what a human being is thinking, since 
we have not yet developed mind reading. But I still enjoyed my research and I am 
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Chapter One: Before the Bomb 
In less than one minute, at 8:16am Japan Standard Time, eighty thousand 
people died instantly. The morning of August 6, 1945 saw the first use of the atomic 
bomb, which was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. Three days later, a second atomic 
bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. In total, the death toll was estimated to be around 
185,000. These events led to the end of World War II in the Pacific theater and have 
undeniably affected U.S. foreign policy and global military relations forever. The 
complexity and secrecy of the atomic bomb raises questions about how President 
Harry S. Truman came to the decision to use one of the deadliest weapons in 
history.1 
Simply looking at the United States’ eventual entanglement in World War II, 
it may be difficult to believe America had no intentions of getting involved in this 
conflict. But during the early years of the war, the United States remained mostly 
isolationist, save providing some financial and supply aid to the Allied powers. This 
policy changed, however, once Japan attacked a U.S. naval base in Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii on December 7, 1941. This unsolicited attack drew President Franklin D. 

















very next day. Joining forces with the other Allied countries of Great Britain, 
France and the Soviet Union, the United States declared war on Japan and in turn, 
on Japan’s ally, Germany. But facing two opponents on such completely separate 
parts of the world created problems for the Allied countries in terms of managing 
resources and the war effort effectively. British and American strategy attempted to 
solve this issue by prioritizing the fronts, tackling the European front first, and 
then the Pacific.2 The United States military was well aware the war against Japan 
would be predominately a naval fight, and the American navy and naval production 
dwarfed that of Japan’s, often by fivefold, or even more in some aspects. This naval 
dominance only increased once the United States eventually turned its full 
attention onto the Pacific in the later years of the war.3 
The United States spent three and a half years focused on fighting in the 
Atlantic theater of the war, from December 8, 1941, the day after the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, until Germany’s surrender on May 9, 1945. While there 
was celebration of the victory in the European front, there was still another war to 
be won against the Japanese in the Pacific. While the United States concentrated 
the majority of its energy and resources on the war with Germany in Europe, they 
had not completely neglected the war with Japan. Over the course of the early years 
of American involvement in the war, the American military faced Japan in many 
important battles. These battles set the stage for American successes once the 







the more critical encounters were the Battles of the Coral Sea in May 1942 and the 
Solomon Islands in the summer of 1943, and the Battle of Midway in June 1942. 
These battles halted the Japanese advancement in the Pacific, despite the fact that 
they were not fought with the full force of the American military, which was 
focusing on Germany.4  
In addition, the military strategy and culture of Japanese society created an 
entirely new beast for the American military, as compared to the fighting style they 
experienced in the war against Germany. The Japanese operated under “a 
mythology that stressed a heaven-granted mandate to assume the leadership of 
eastern Asia.”5 Furthermore, a critical component of Japanese society was the 
emphasis on maintaining honor. Japan’s culture featured “a willingness to accept 
death as the means and end of resistance.”6 Japanese soldiers and military 
commanders believed it was honorable to die fighting; whereas, it was highly 
shameful to surrender and leave a battle alive but not victorious. A common 
phenomena stemming from this philosophy was kamikaze attacks. Kamikaze were 
Japanese airmen who, in a desperate attempt to clinch the victory for Japan, would 
intentionally fly their aircraft into enemy ships, killing themselves but also 
inflicting damage upon the enemy’s vessel. Overall, the Japanese military fought 









As a result, military strategy for the defeat of Japan was much different than 
for the defeat of Germany. The Japanese military had attacked and taken control of 
the Philippines, Siam, Burma, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, Korea, 
large swaths of land in northern China and East Asia, as well as a series of smaller 
chain islands in the Pacific Ocean.8  The American military’s plan focused on re-
acquiring one Pacific island at a time and pushing back Japanese control in the 
region to the home islands of Japan. If this “island hopping” campaign were 
successful, eventually American forces would use islands close enough to Japan to 
use bomber planes to destroy key industrial centers that were critical to Japan’s 
war effort. This island hopping strategy was incredibly violent and required 
enormous amounts of manpower and supplies to slog from island to island.9 
The American strategy of island hopping took a serious toll on the American 
forces. Each new island presented harrowing new problems for the soldiers 
attempting to liberate it from Japanese control. Many islands tended to be tiny in 
area, and therefore lacked the landmass necessary for elaborate military 
maneuvers. The climates of these Pacific islands were tropical, hot and humid, and 
their topography ranged from rainforests to barren rocks. Soldiers had to adapt to 
changes in climate and landscape every time they reached a new island, which was 
strenuous and draining. In addition, island hopping strained military resources. 
Moving entire companies, as well as aircraft carriers and battleships, almost 







to mention a significant amount of work. To top it off, the Japanese soldiers “fought 
close-quarter, desperate battles of unusual savagery . . . driven by battle ethics that 
allowed only victory or death, fought to the last man rather than surrender.” All of 
these factors made each and every battle in the American strategy of island hopping 
incredibly costly in multiple ways.10 
The worst of these island battles were Iwo Jima and Okinawa, with Iwo Jima 
being the “largest amphibious marine assault ever, and the bloodiest.” Between just 
these two battles, it is estimated that, in total, about 110,000 Americans were either 
killed or wounded. While the ferocity of the Japanese style of fighting contributed to 
these high casualty rates, it can also be partially blamed on the sheer length of the 
battles. The Battle of Iwo Jima began on February 19, 1945 and the island was 
declared captured on March 26, over one month later, while the Battle of Okinawa 
began on April 1, 1945, and the island was not taken until June 30, a full two 
months of combat. These battles, though hard-fought, did provide crucial advances 
for the American military, however. The island of Iwo Jima became an airfield base 
for American fighter pilots, and the island of Okinawa was the perfect strategic 
point to block any supply ships from reaching Japan from the south. This was an 
especially sweet victory because Japan’s main supply of oil was imported through 
the southern waters, and American control of Okinawa could cut the supply.11 
The purpose of the American island hopping strategy was to take away 







ever closer to Honshu, the main island of Japan. Military leaders had been loosely 
planning an invasion into this island since the early days of the war, as the final 
attack to end the war in the Pacific. After the victory in Europe and the U.S. 
turning to focus her economic and military might on Japan, the plans for the 
invasion of Honshu became increasingly defined, earning the codename Downfall. 
But the sheer violence that the Japanese exhibited throughout their campaigns and 
their defiant unwillingness to surrender up to and including suicide or death, 
deeply affected Americans and military leaders. The stories and images of the 
brutality of the battles in the Pacific and the rapidly rising death tolls were 
disturbing, and they only seemed to get worse as the Unites States battled closer 
and closer to the main islands of Japan. The United States began to see the 
Japanese soldiers, and by extension Japan as a whole, as vicious, bloodthirsty and 
decidedly unwilling to compromise. This perspective may have had an influence 
later, once it came time to make decisions regarding the use of the new atomic 
weaponry.12 
The United States commander-in-chief, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
initiated research into new armaments. During his presidency, he commissioned a 
secret project for the research and development of atomic energy and weaponry. 
This confidential undertaking, called the Manhattan Project, employed some of the 
most knowledgeable scientists, physicists and engineers in the world at the time, 






three Nobel Prize winning scientists, Arthur H. Compton, Harold Urey, and Ernest 
Lawrence. Brigadier General Leslie Groves was appointed to lead the project in 
September 1942.13 Groves made sure the Manhattan Project’s confidentiality policy 
was strictly enforced. No unnecessary persons were informed of its existence, let 
alone its purpose. This included some surprisingly important officials, such as Vice 
President Harry S. Truman and high-ranking military leaders like Generals 
Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower.14 
The purpose of Manhattan Project was to harness the nuclear fission process 
into something that could be used strategically in a military setting. But in order to 
keep the project secret, production was split into three different centers in 
Tennessee, New Mexico and Washington State. The plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee 
predominately worked with uranium, an extremely radioactive and dangerous 
element. The plant at Hanford, Washington, worked to manufacture plutonium. 
And the center in Los Alamos, New Mexico was the mind center of the operation, 




















new ideas. The bomb would eventually be assembled at the New Mexico location. 
Splitting the Manhattan Project’s research and production into multiple facilities 
was an attempt to maintain the confidentiality of the program. If one facility were 
to be infiltrated by spies or those with ill will, they would only have gained access to 
one-third of the production or research information. Additionally, the scientists 
working in the Tennessee or Washington state locations could be kept as ill-
informed as possible, since they would only be able to assess one piece of the puzzle. 
By the spring of 1945, though, the Manhattan Project scientists had a fairly 
comprehensive understanding of the workings of atomic energy and were mere 
steps away from assembling a fully functional atomic bomb for testing.15 
President Roosevelt did not live to see victory in either Europe or the Pacific, 
or the success of the Manhattan Project. He died on April 12, 1945, seventeen days 
before Hitler’s suicide and twenty-seven days before Germany’s surrender. That 
evening, Vice President Harry S. Truman was sworn in as the President of the 
United States. But because of the confidentiality of the Manhattan Project, Truman 
was entirely unaware of the revolutionary scientific development now under his 
control, and the decision that he would have to make that would literally change the 
world prior to his inauguration as president. After President Roosevelt’s death, and 
the new President Truman’s inauguration, the first person to inform Truman of the 
existence and purpose of the Manhattan Project was the Secretary of War, Henry 





“immense project that was underway – a project looking to the development of a 
new explosive of almost unbelievable destructive power.” Stimson’s startling and 
incomplete information confused the new president.16 
The next person to discuss the atomic bomb with the new president was 
James Byrnes, who provided slightly more information than Secretary Stimson. 
Byrnes had an extensive career in all three branches of the United States federal 
government, while maintaining a close relationship with President Roosevelt. 
Byrnes was not officially briefed on the details of the Manhattan Project, but his 
supplemental information was enough to clarify Truman’s confusion regarding the 
new destructive power Stimson mentioned. Truman would later make Byrnes his 
Secretary of State.17 
On April 25, 1945, President Truman received an official briefing regarding 
the Manhattan Project from Secretary Stimson and General Leslie Groves. Truman 
recalled that Stimson told him, “the project was nearing completion and that a 
bomb could be expected within another four months.” Stimson also suggested 
Truman should form some sort of committee of qualified individuals to advise the 
president on matters relating to atomic policy for both during the war and 
afterwards. Following this advice, Truman formed the Interim Committee, which 
was comprised of eight key players in atomic decision-making. Soon-to-be Secretary 








War Stimson was appointed the chairman. The Interim Committee also organized a 
secondary advisory scientific panel consisting of the lead scientists on the project. 
This panel helped provide perspective of those who created the bomb and their 
opinions on how it should be used.18 
In the summer of 1945, the Manhattan Project finally assembled the first 
atomic bomb. On July 16, 1945 at 4:00 am, at the Trinity Test Site in New Mexico, 
the first detonation of the atomic bomb was successful. A general described the 
detonation: “There came this tremendous burst of light. The whole country was 
lighted by a searching light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. 
It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue.” The blast was so intense and the roar 
so loud that it awoke a sleeping town 30 miles away from the test site. Residents 
saw “a pillar of fire, six miles high,” but were kept uninformed as to the cause of 
this mysterious and terrifying event.19  
President Truman learned of the success of the Trinity Test while he was in 
occupied Germany attending the Potsdam Conference. A coded message containing 
















better than had been expected. Little did President Truman know the implications 






Chapter 2: Planning an Invasion 
After the successful testing of the atomic bomb, the next two weeks involved 
many meetings, memos and questions that needed to be answered. Eventually, the 
United States, Britain and China issued the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945, 
instructing Japan to surrender or face “prompt and utter destruction.” Two days 
later, the Japanese government refused the declaration.21 This refusal left 
President Truman and his Interim Committee with the decision on how to best end 
the war with Japan. There were three options considered: invasion into mainland 
Japan, a naval blockade around the island or use the new atomic bomb. 
The option of an invasion of Japan was seriously considered. In fact, as most 
military leaders were unaware of the Manhattan Project and the weapon that was 
being built, an invasion of the mainland of Japan was considered to be the only 
viable option. The Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a complete invasion plan to 
President Truman in a meeting in June. They believed this plan would “clearly 
indicate to the Japanese how firmly resolved the U.S. was to bring about their 
complete surrender,” ending the war in the Pacific and thus finally ending the 
Second World War.22 
In order to achieve this “complete surrender,” military leaders developed a 
highly detailed plan that culminated in a full-scale invasion of the homeland of 
Japan, featuring support from the Soviet Union. The plan as a whole was named 







Olympic and Operation Coronet. The first part, Olympic, scheduled an attack on 
Kyushu, the large, southern island of Japan, beginning on November 1, 1945, which 
would be referred to as X-Day, to follow the theme of Normandy’s D-Day. This 
invasion drew upon the experiences of the island hopping campaign and comprised 
a coordinated naval and aerial bombardment following an amphibious invasion of 
ground troops. The Soviet army would simultaneously attack Japan from the north, 
through their occupations in China. While working with the Soviets was not ideal, 
President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Stalin prearranged plans for coordination at 
an earlier conference. Additionally, the sheer size of the Soviet military would be a 
clear asset. The second half of the attack plan, Coronet, planned for an invasion of 
another major Japanese island, Honshu, in the spring of 1946, with the invasion 
landing fittingly named Y-Day. These invasions were to be a combination of land 
and sea assaults, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur.23 
President Truman’s main concern about this plan was the casualties. Along 
with most other Americans, Truman was aware of the Japanese ruthlessness and 
unwillingness to surrender, as was demonstrated throughout the island hopping 
campaign, but especially the high costs in taking Okinawa and Iwo Jima. He 
wanted to ensure that as few American lives as possible were lost, and an invasion 
into the core of the Japanese empire would surely be met with every method of 
defense the Japanese could possibly muster. Along with the invasion plans, the 







casualties incurred from the battle at Okinawa and estimated casualties for a 
hypothetical attack on any other militarily strategic Japanese island. The invasion 
plan presented to Truman called for about 767,000 soldiers, and at a 35 percent 
casualty rate, 268,000 men would be either wounded or killed. This casualty 
estimation was not the only one that President Truman received, however.24  
Former President Herbert Hoover also sent a memo to President Truman 
regarding a possible invasion of Japan. Despite the fact that he had not been 
officially briefed on the situation, Hoover urged negotiated peace with Japan or else 
“it might cost ‘the lives of 500,000 to a million boys’ to end the war.” The severity of 
Hoover’s estimates unsettled the president who then forwarded the memo to 
Stimson, among other advisors. Stimson also forwarded his copy of the Hoover’s 
memo to General George Marshall. General Marshall returned two responses to 
Stimson, both of which claimed Hoover’s estimates were much too high. Truman 
never saw the two responses. It was likely clear to Truman that Hoover was ill-
informed and therefore not in the position to make reliable estimates, but the sheer 
enormity of the numbers Hoover quoted may have unsettled President Truman to 
some extent.25 
Some of Truman’s military advisors provided another set of casualty 
estimates for the invasion. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, General Douglas 
MacArthur and Chief of Staff of the United States Army General George Marshall 






were lower than Hoover’s estimates by about half. Interestingly, President Truman 
never saw any of these casualty estimates. If this information reached Truman, it 
might have affected his later decision to use the bomb. The lower casualty estimates 
may have evened out the balance between the loss of American lives in the event of 
an incursion into Japan versus the loss of Japanese lives if atomic weaponry was 
used.26 Perhaps if President Truman had seen the lower estimates, his fears may 
have been quelled slightly. If Truman had not been so fearful of high American 
causalities, he may have never used the bomb.  
A combined naval blockade and aerial bombardment of Japan was another, 
lesser-known option to end the war. This proposal would have been expensive and 
time-consuming, but President Truman considered it seriously, nonetheless. He 
wrote in his diary on June 17, 1945, “I have to decide Japanese strategy – shall we 
invade Japan proper or shall we bomb and blockade? That is my hardest decision to 
date.” A naval blockade and aerial bombardment of Japan would combine to deplete 
Japanese supplies and bring surrender more quickly. But President Truman’s 
military advisors believed more along the lines of a cooperation of a naval blockade, 
an air bombardment, and an invasion into Kyushu would bring a Japanese 
surrender. They did not want these elements to work independently. Stimson wrote 
that, as of July 1945, “we were planning an intensified sea and air blockade, and 
greatly intensified strategic air bombing, through the summer and early fall, to be 





added that this invasion of Kyushu was to be followed by “an invasion of the main 
land of Honshu in the spring of 1946.” Stimson’s remarks demonstrate that the 
naval blockade was never truly intended to serve on its own, but instead as a small 
part of a larger assault.27 
The final option to end the war in the Pacific was the atomic bomb. But there 
were many unanswered questions about the new bomb. No one was really sure how 
powerful the blast would be until the Trinity Test. In fact, General Leslie Groves 
sent an estimate to General George Marshall that the blast of the first detonation of 
the atomic bomb would be equal to the explosion of 500 tons of TNT, but once the 
bomb was tested, the blast was actually equal to 20,000 tons of TNT. Once it was 
understood how much devastation the bomb could inflict, the new weapon took on a 
new importance. Under the previous estimates of force equaling 500 tons of TNT, 
the atomic bomb would still have been much stronger than regular bombs. But the 
results from the Trinity Test showed the bomb was at least forty times stronger 
than that, heightening both the possibility for destruction and the weight of the 
decision to use it or not.28 
Throughout the summer, a few possibilities for potential uses of the bomb 
arose, aside from the two cut-and-dry options, use the bomb or not.. The bomb could 
have been used as only a demonstration. Manhattan Project scientists could have 









resulted in no actual destruction or loss of life, but would have hopefully scared the 
Japanese into surrendering. There were also different possibilities regarding when 
and how many times surrender should be offered before use of the bomb. The 
efficacy of asking for surrender before the use of the bomb, though, was doubtful, 
without clear examples of the destruction of the bomb as a motivating factor. 
There were a few groups of people related to the Manhattan Project whose 
opinions were important to Truman in his decision-making process. One such group 
was Truman’s military advisors. But the military leaders were dubious about the 
effectiveness of the new bomb. Some doubted the bomb would even detonate 
properly. Most high-ranking military leaders believed a technical demonstration of 
the bomb instead of strategic use was a poor idea because the bomb might not 
detonate and the United States would look foolish in the face of invited Japanese 
officials.29 
President Truman’s personal military advisor and Chief-of-Staff Fleet 
Admiral William D. Leahy was one of those skeptics. Admiral Leahy was doubtful 
that the atomic bomb could even be made, let alone be as powerful as it was 
estimated to be. He thought that mass bombardment was “‘against the civilized 
laws of war’” and that “‘these new concepts of ‘total war’ [were] basically distasteful 
to the soldier and sailor of [his] generation.’” He also believed that direct invasion of 
the mainland of Japan would be difficult and bloody, since an invasion on Kyushu 





believed that an air bombardment and a naval blockade would be the best way to 
end the war with the least cost in lives. He was mostly alone in this belief, however, 
since most of Truman’s other advisors ruled that option unviable as the sole 
strategy to end the war, like Leahy wanted it to be. The eventual course of action of 
full, tactical use of the atomic bomb was, therefore, not something that pleased 
Admiral Leahy.30 
Most other military leaders seemed to agree with Admiral Leahy’s casualty 
estimates or that Leahy was only slightly overestimating, even if they did not agree 
with his opinions on how to end the war. Leahy noted in a diary entry on June 18, 
1945, that General Marshall estimated invasion casualties at 63,000 men out of 
190,000 troops, about a 33 percent loss, which was close to his own estimate. They 
did disagree, however, about the invasion plans, Codename Downfall. Truman’s 
other military advisors such as General Marshall, General MacArthur and Admiral 
Nimitz, believed the United States should launch an invasion of mainland Japan. In 
the same diary entry, Leahy described the meeting between the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, President Truman and a few other military leaders: “General Marshall and 
Admiral King [members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Leahy] both strongly 
advocated an invasion of Kyushu at the earliest practicable date.” Truman even 
authorized the execution of the plan of attack at that meeting, prior to the 
completion of and successful testing of the atomic bomb. He wished the death toll 







“‘clear on the situation now’ and was ‘quite sure’ the chiefs should proceed with the 
invasion plans.” The invasion was never carried out though, because it was 
scheduled for November 1945 and by that time, the atomic bomb had been used and 
Japan had already surrendered.31 
Secretary Henry Stimson’s opinion of a course of action against Japan was 
different from most of the other military leaders advising Truman. Stimson wrote in 
his diary about a meeting with Truman the day after the meeting Leahy described. 
On June 19, 1945 Stimson remembered “it became very evident today in the 
discussion that we all feel that some way should be found of inducing Japan to yield 
without a fight to the finish,” implying that Stimson was against a direct invasion of 
Japan to end the war. This then suggests that Stimson was an advocate for tactical 
use of the atomic bomb, and his position as a close advisor to Truman may have had 
an influence on the president’s ultimate decision.32 
Another curious note from Stimson came a year and a half after the bombs 
were dropped when Stimson published an article in Harper’s Magazine defending 
the decision to drop the bomb. He wrote that he was given casualty estimates for 
the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu that totaled over one million men. No 
estimates were found that reached the extremes that Stimson claimed he was told. 
The closest estimate found was former President Hoover’s uninformed casualty 
estimate of between 500,000 and a million, so it is unclear why Stimson cited those 







the decision to use the bomb, though. It is very possible that Stimson used his 
personal beliefs to influence the information Truman received during the weeks 
leading up to the bomb, such as influential casualty estimates, only allowing 
Truman to have access to military information that would influence him to end the 
war swiftly with the use of the bomb.33 
Another important opinion in Truman’s decision was that of the scientists 
who created the weapon. The director of the Manhattan Project General Groves and 
Arthur Compton of the Interim Committee asked J. Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest 
Lawrence and a scientist named Farrington Daniels to poll the scientists at Los 
Alamos, Berkeley and the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory about the use of the 
bomb. These polls comprised only one question: “Which of the following procedures 
comes closest to your choice as to the way in which any new weapons that we may 
develop should be used in the Japanese war?” The results were as follows: 
46% -- Give a military demonstration to Japan to be 
followed by a renewed opportunity for surrender before full 
use of the weapons is employed. 
26% -- Give an experimental demonstration in this 
country, with representatives of Japan present: followed 
by a new opportunity for surrender before full use of the 





15% -- Use them in the manner that is from the military 
point of view most effective in bringing about prompt 
Japanese surrender at minimum human cost to our armed 
forces. 
11% -- Withhold military use of the weapons, but make 
public experimental demonstration of their effectiveness. 
2% -- Keep the whole project secret and do not use the 
weapon at all.34 
While syntax and vocabulary choice can be debated, it appears that 85 
percent of the scientists polled voted against full military tactical use. To further 
that view, the words “renewed opportunity for surrender” in the most popular 
option and “new opportunity for surrender” in the second most popular option 
suggest that surrender should already have been offered before any use of this new 
weaponry. Curiously, only 15 percent of the polled scientists voted for the option 
President Truman eventually chose.35 
The scientific advisory panel also provided their “Recommendations on the 
Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons” to President Truman and the Interim 
Committee. In this report, they described how they believed the new atomic 
weaponry should be handled. They made it quite clear that they have “no claim to 
special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are 






demonstration of the new weapon would not bring victory, that only “direct military 
use,” would bring a Japanese surrender. However, the report does mention that this 
was not a unanimous conclusion. It is curious that only 15 percent of the scientists 
working on the production of the bomb voted for full, tactical use of the bomb, but 
the majority of the scientific advisory panel, comprised of the supervising scientists 
of the project, voted the same way. Truman needed to decide whose opinion he 
trusted more, that of the working scientists who handled the bomb and its 
technology every day or that of the advising supervisors, whose names would go 
down as a footnote in history as the architects of the most powerful weapon ever 
created.36 
Truman’s specially appointed Interim Committee also had their own 
interpretation of the atomic bomb, but the opinions were varied. Arthur Compton, 
who commissioned the poll of the Manhattan Project scientists, interpreted the poll 
responses in a strange way. He read the results as “87% voted for its military use, 
at least if after other means were tried this was found necessary to bring 
surrender,” instead of 85 percent voting against full military use. It seems as 
though Compton interpreted the results to fit into his own opinions. Arthur 
Compton, a member of the scientific advisory panel, was the brother of Karl 








some influence over each other and their respective committees, both of which 
reported to and influenced President Truman.37 
Another member of the Interim Committee, Undersecretary of the Navy 
Ralph Bard, had another different opinion. Bard believed that the United States 
should not use the bomb unless Japan was warned beforehand. He wrote a 
memorandum detailing his opinion, saying he “had the feeling very definitely that 
the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could 
use as a medium of surrender.” It seems as though Bard opposed dropping the 
bomb, unless it was used as a warning to the Japanese. If Bard’s plan proved 
effective, and the Japanese did surrender after a warning, then the atomic bomb 
would never have been used. It is possible that Bard was actually against the use of 
the bomb, but did not want to directly disagree with the other members of the 
committee, especially when some of those other members and additional military 
advisors were his superiors.38 
 Truman inherited both the plan to invade the mainland of Japan and the 
plans for the development of the atomic bomb from his predecessor, Roosevelt. And 
this complicated Truman’s decision making process. If President Roosevelt truly 
believed in the success of the planned invasion into Honshu, then what was the 
purpose of the Manhattan Project to create atomic weaponry? But Roosevelt passed 
away before the successful detonation test of the atomic bomb, and was therefore 







creation. Roosevelt seriously considered the invasion plan, as evidenced by his 
notations on a map titled “Japan and Adjacent Regions of Asia and the Pacific 
Ocean,” in the Map Room of the White House. Roosevelt penned a short military to-
do list, culminating in a simple bullet labeled “Invade Jap Homeland Fall of 1945.” 
But the invasion plans would likely be an incredibly costly endeavor. What would 
cost more, the destruction of the atomic bomb or the invasion? All of these questions 
fell heavily on President Truman’s shoulders, as he was forced to make a choice that 







Chapter 3: The Atom Bomb 
 Once the atomic bomb was a reality, President Truman’s choice became 
increasingly more pressing. His options were a full-scale invasion into the Japanese 
homeland or the use of the new atomic bomb. Truman was well aware of the 
seriousness of atomic weaponry. He may not have yet understood the exact physical 
effects of the bomb, as was the case with most of the scientists, but he understood 
the political implications. He wrote in his memoirs reflecting on his time in office, 
“We were now in possession of a weapon that would not only revolutionize war but 
could alter the course of history and civilization.” Truman’s remarks were 
hauntingly accurate.40 
 Despite the wide range of advisors surrounding the president, Truman held a 
higher regard for the opinions of two men in particular: General George Marshall 
and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. He cited “the greatest respect . . . for the 
experience and judgment” these two men brought to the table. His faith in their 
skills most likely led Truman to believe their opinions about the use of the atomic 
bomb as well. Secretary Stimson was an advocate for tactile use of the bomb and 
General Marshall showed Truman multiple casualty estimates for an invasion into 
Japan that were so costly, they likely influenced him away from the invasion option. 
Truman told his biographer, Jonathan Daniels, Marshall “thought such a landing 
would involve half a million casualties.” Truman also wrote in a letter in 1953, “It 






quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million, on the 
American side alone, with an equal number of the enemy.” Truman noted other 
military personal agreed with Marshall’s assessment. These estimates are 
especially critical because if Truman had been under the impression that as many 
Americans as Japanese were going to be killed, he would likely have been heavily 
influenced towards using the bomb. It would have been better to only kill 200,000 
Japanese, as opposed to a million Japanese and a million Americans.41 
 In the end, Harry Truman’s decision came down to “how soon we could wind 
up the war in the Pacific.” He had been open to the invasion plans, but after the 
successful testing, Truman was convinced that the atomic bomb, not an invasion, 
would lead to the quickest end. A panel of scientists commissioned by the Interim 
Committee advised Truman the bomb should be “used without specific warning and 
against a target that would clearly show its devastating strength,” and “no technical 
demonstration they might propose, such as over a deserted island, would be likely 
to bring the war to an end.” This left the president with only one option: a full, 
military use of the atomic bomb.42 
On July 26, 1945, President Truman, along with British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill and Chairman of the Nationalist Government in China Chiang 







ordered Japan to surrender or “face prompt and utter destruction.”43 The 
declaration’s terms of surrender included removing from power anyone who 
encouraged Japan’s push for “world domination,” as well as disarmament of the 
military, charges for war criminals and cessation of economic activity that would 
rearm the military. It does mention specifically, however, that the Japanese people 
will not be enslaved, and they will be allowed to continue other economic activities, 
as long as they remained peaceful and accepting of their loss. This threatening 
document signaled the last official opportunity for the Japanese to surrender before 
the use of the new atomic bomb, without directly informing the Japanese of what 
was to come. Two days later, the Japanese officially refused the declaration and 
declined to surrender. President Truman had to make a decision.44 
In Japan, accepting the Allied Powers’ push for surrender was not an option 
that was seriously considered. Japanese culture preferred death to surrender. 
Additionally, the Japanese feared if they were to surrender to the Allies, they would 
be forced to abolish the structure of the Emperorship. Their emperor, Hirohito, was 
not only an important political figure but a treasured religious leader as well. The 
Potsdam Declaration did not make any mention of or condition for the preservation 
of the Emperor in the terms of surrender, and the Japanese did not want to risk the 







Emperor would be eliminated. Therefore, Japanese military leaders began to 
prepare for the natural continuance of the war, the next Allied invasion.45 
 Despite the fact that the leaders of the United States, China and Great 
Britain issued the Potsdam Declaration, it is hard to believe that any of them 
actually expected the Japanese to heed such a warning. The ferocious and 
unrelenting fighting in the Pacific battles indicated that the Japanese were 
unwilling to surrender. American leaders were all of the opinion that Japanese 
surrender was highly unlikely, but they differed in their opinions on how to end the 
war. Most military leaders thought that Japanese surrender could be achieved by 
relentless continuation of the invasion of the mainland, whereas most of the 
scientists thought the bomb would be the quickest and most decisive path to ending 
the war. It was universally agreed upon, though, that Japan should be offered 
surrender before either plan, invasion or bomb. Truman tried to convince Japan to 
surrender using threats and severe language, but it was always highly doubtful 
that the surrender would be accepted. The Potsdam Declaration therefore takes on 
the role of a tick off an ethical to-do list. The Japanese turned down this official 
warning and chance to surrender, as was expected by most everyone, and this 
opened the door to use of the bomb without heavy ethical criticism.  
The military order authorizing the use of the bomb on Japan clearly defined 
the relative uselessness of the Potsdam Declaration.  It was made clear that Japan 





opportunity, the Potsdam Declaration, issued on July 26, warned Japan to 
surrender or face “prompt and utter destruction.” The problem, however, lies in the 
date on the official military authorization of use of the atomic bomb. The 
authorization letter states, “The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its 
first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 
August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.” This 
letter was dated “24 July 1945”, two days before Japan was warned to surrender. It 
seems as though allowing Japan an opportunity to surrender may have been merely 
a formality and that military leaders were aware that Japan was not going to 
surrender that easily, resulting in the deployment of the atomic bomb anyway. This 
authorization letter was not made public at the time, however, as it was a top-secret 
military document, allowing the general public to believe that Japan had an honest 
opportunity to surrender before they were bombed.46  
Japan was strategic about the concept of surrender, though. After the fall of 
Saipan in the summer of 1944, even before the war in Europe was over, Japanese 
military leaders knew they would be unable to defeat the American military, 
especially if the war raged on for a significant length of time.  It was apparent 
United States military forces outmatched Japan’s in essentially every category. But 
the Japanese could not surrender immediately, as they were afraid they would be 
forced to abolish the emperor. They had to time their surrender perfectly, short 







convince the Allies to let them keep their emperor. The Supreme Council was in 
charge of Japanese military decisions, led by Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō and 
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kōichi Kido, as well as Emperor Hirohito and they 
were tasked with the delicate decision of how long to wait. They believed, even 
though they would be unable to defeat the United States militarily, they might be 
able to just keep fighting until the Americans lost the willpower to continue the war 
and offered amenable and lenient terms of surrender. There was some disagreement 
among the council members about how long to wait. Some argued if the war 
continued long enough for the American military to infiltrate the Japanese 
homelands, there would be absolute devastation and death for the Japanese people, 
and that was not a worthy price to pay to avoid the shame of surrender.47 
There was still the question of where to drop the bomb. Following the 
instructions of President Truman, General Leslie Groves commissioned the 
preexisting Target Committee to perform a military study to locate the best cities 
that would be both militaristically and psychologically effective in defeating Japan, 
or forcing their surrender. This committee had previously been working on selecting 
targets for regular bombs, but was tasked in May to choose targets for the potential 
atomic bomb. A preliminary report found sixteen Japanese cities to be sizeable 
enough to bring about Japanese surrender if bombed. A summarized report was 









targets: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, Kokura Arsenal and Niigata. Stimson and 
Truman later removed Kyoto from the list for being too significant to Japanese 
culture and historic art, as well as the home of the treasured Japanese Emperor, an 
interesting show of compassion in this narrative full of destruction. Tokyo was also 
left off the list because Truman believed the atomic bomb was a military weapon 
and should be “used as a weapon of war in the manner prescribed by the laws of 
war.” In the final military order to drop the bomb, however, issued a few months 
later on July 24, 1945, four approved targets were listed, in the order of attack: 
Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.48 
 On August 6, 1945, at the crack of dawn, an observation plane took off from 
an American air base in the Mariana Islands and headed for Hiroshima to assess if 
the weather in the area would be suitable for the deployment of the atomic bomb 
that day. The plane signaled the base, “Fair weather, ready for air raid.” The local 
Japanese military headquarters saw the foreign plane and issued an air raid alert 
that an attack was imminent, but the observation plane flew off and the air raid 














At 8:15am Japanese Standard Time, the world bore witness to the first use of 
atomic weaponry on human targets. This first bomb, aboard a plane named the 
Enola Gay, detonated forty three seconds after it was dropped from the cargo hold. 
The explosion was approximately six hundred meters above the city, which flooded 
the area with “a tremendous flash of light [that] cut across the sky.”50 At the 
epicenter, temperatures topped several million degrees Celsius and a fireball 
radiated out from the blast.51 
This first atomic bomb shook Hiroshima. The pressure that pushed out from 
the epicenter of the blast flattened all buildings and trees within an approximate 
two-mile radius, and structural damages were seen as far away as six miles from 
the center of the blast. Three-quarters of a mile away from the epicenter, a woman 
tried to escape the blast “when something picked her up and she seemed to fly into 
the next room over the raised sleeping platform, pursued by parts of her house.” 
Despite all of the damage, there are almost no reports of Hiroshima survivors 
hearing any noise with the detonation of the bomb, possibly resulting from hearing 
damage or shock from the blast. Total casualty figures were estimated a few months 
later in November 1945 to be as high as 130,000 dead and 220,000 injured in some 
capacity or another.52 
After the first bomb, Japan scrambled to understand exactly what happened 








incurred from just one bomb in particular confused the Japanese. Regular bombs 
were common weapons in the war, but no single bomb had ever caused the 
widespread, instantaneous destruction before. Mr. Kiyoshi Tanimoto, pastor of 
Hiroshima Methodist Church, reported: 
Hundreds and hundreds [of victims] who were fleeing 
[Hiroshima], and every one of them seemed to be hurt in 
some way. The eyebrows of some were burned off and skin 
hung from their faces and hands. Others, because of pain, 
held their arms up as if carrying something in both 
hands. Some were vomiting as they walked. Many were 
naked or in shreds of clothing. On some undressed bodies, 
the burns had made patterns – of undershirt straps and 
suspenders and, on the skin of some women (since white 
repelled the heat from the bomb and dark clothes 
absorbed it and conducted it to the skin), the shapes of 
flowers they had had on their kimonos.53 
This dramatic destruction, combined with the surprise bombing, sent the Japanese 
scrambling to understand just what had happened.  
Following the first bomb on Hiroshima, the United States intended to wait 
five days for a sign of surrender from the Japanese. Weather reports for the 





bomb was pushed up two days. When no surrender was received, the American 
military dropped a second bomb, this time in Nagasaki. This bomb, on August 9, 
1945, was originally intended for Kokura, but the forecasted rains were already 
upon the city and the plane was forced to head to its second target, Nagasaki. 
Because of the change of location, the second bomb was dropped later in the day as 
compared to the first bomb in Hiroshima. 54  
The explosion over Nagasaki was stronger and more destructive than its 
counterpart in Hiroshima. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima, referred to as “Little 
Boy,” was comprised of uranium and weighed 12.5 kilotons; whereas, the Nagasaki 
bomb, “Fat Man,” was predominately plutonium and weighed 22 kilotons. It is 
unclear exactly why two different types of radioactive material were used in the 
bombs, but the change in materials led to slightly different designs and weights 
between the two bombs. Because this second bomb was larger, the destruction of 
physical property, such as buildings and infrastructure was greater in force in 
Nagasaki than in Hiroshima, and the radius of impact was larger in Nagasaki. 
Hiroshima still suffered the higher number of casualties, however, because it was 
more densely populated. The casualty estimates for the bomb in Hiroshima reached 
130,000 dead and 220,000 injured, compared to estimates for Nagasaki, which 
reached 70,000 dead and 200,000 injured by October 1945.55 
While the detonation of the atom bomb may have produced devastating 






Those victims, who were not crushed by falling structures, suffered severe burns, 
from both radiation and the sheer heat of the fireball of the blast. Historian Frank 
Chinnock described the devastation in areas closest to the fireball: “within the Red 
Circle of Death, it was as if a malevolent god had suddenly focused a gigantic 
blowtorch on a small section of our planet . . . . The people exposed within that 
doomed section neither knew nor felt anything, and their blackened, unrecognizable 
forms dropped silently where they stood.” To make matters worse, no one could yet 
understand the long-term effects from the radiation. The radioactive material inside 
the bomb created frequent instances of radiation burns, cancers and tumors in 
surviving victims.56 
Following this second attack, the Japanese Emperor Hirohito and his cabinet 
issued an intent to negotiate surrender. The Japanese were hesitant to surrender 
unconditionally because they feared they would be forced to denounce their 
treasured Emperor, but they wanted to prevent yet another devastating atomic 
bomb. After some negotiation on the exact terms of surrender, the Allied Powers 
allowed Japan to retain Emperor Hirohito, as long as he agreed to cease hostilities 
against the Allies and completely enforce the capitulation throughout the country. 
Japan agreed to these terms and President Truman accepted the Japanese 
surrender on August 14 at 7:00pm. About two weeks later, on September 2, an 
official surrender ceremony was performed on the United States battleship Missouri 






While this may have officially signified the end of the Second World War, the scars 
left behind continue to affect the world to this day.57  
 The decision to deploy the new, incredibly deadly atomic weaponry could not 
have been an easy one for President Truman. His options came down to a full-scale 
invasion into the strongholds of the Japanese Empire, which would have resulted in 
hundreds of thousands of lives lost between the Japanese and American militaries, 
or deployment of the atomic bomb, which would result in the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands of innocent Japanese citizens. Both of these choices would result in 
unavoidable death, so the heart of Truman’s choice had to be whose lives were more 
valuable. The first instinct of an American is to say that the lives of the American 
military were more important, and that the bomb was justified. The American lives 
on the line were members of the military. Many soldiers were drafted, and did not 
choose to fight by their own free will. One then turns to the issue of the Japanese. 
Their nation was at war with the United States, so why should they be valued? But 
the locations selected as targets for the atomic bombs were civilian not military 
targets, and were therefore full of innocent women and children. This is the ethical 







Chapter 4: Ulterior Motives 
The intent behind the use of the atomic bomb on Japan was to force Japan’s 
surrender and end the war quickly. Secretary of War Henry Stimson stated this 
goal very clearly in an article published in Harper’s Magazine in 1947 “the principle 
political, social and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 
was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan.” Other military leaders involved 
with the decision repeated similar statements, including President Truman himself. 
In the summer of 1945, the United States military faced a long and bloody invasion, 
as “the Japanese Army’s essential strategy was to fight a massive battle for the 
homeland.” The atomic bomb was a quick way to avoid or ease such an invasion. 
But there may be some lesser-discussed rationale behind the decision-making 
process, including retaliation for the attack on Pearl Harbor and the general 
violence of the war in the Pacific, as a display of power and military superiority to 
the world, and to prevent the Soviet Union from exercising extensive influence into 
Japan.58 
A possible reason to use the bomb on Japan was as retaliation and revenge 
for both the surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and the general brutality of the war in 
the Pacific. There were 3,600 American casualties from the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Additionally, the Japanese assault destroyed millions of dollars of naval vessels, 
aircraft and other military equipment, but the unprovoked aspect of the attack 







read to the press by the assistant press secretary, President Truman even 
referenced the attack on Pearl Harbor in relation to purposes for the bomb, saying, 
“The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid 
many fold.” Later, he ominously said “When you have to deal with a beast you have 
to treat him as a beast.” Historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa comments, “Punishing the 
Japanese, soldiers and civilians alike, with atomic devastation represented in 
Truman’s mind a just retribution against the ‘savage and cruel people’ who had 
dared to make a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and mistreat American POWs.” It is 
clear that, while the attack on Pearl Harbor was not the sole motivating factor for 
the use of the bomb on Japan, enacting revenge on the Japanese for the unsolicited 
attack was a sweet benefit.59 
Once the war had actually begun, the Japanese were incredibly relentless in 
their fighting techniques and strategies, and surrender was actually considered 
shameful. As a result, the battles in the Pacific were long and bloody, like Iwo Jima 
and Okinawa, which totaled about 110,000 casualties. Overall, there were 
approximately 170,000 American casualties from the Pacific theater. With these 
numbers, almost two thirds of United States casualties in the Pacific theater of 
World War II were incurred in the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa alone. But 












Guadalcanal, Saigon, the Solomon Islands and the Philippines, all of which blocked 
Japanese advancement through the Pacific, were also long and bloody. A direct 
invasion of the Japanese mainland would likely have resulted in as high or even 
higher casualties than previous battles. President Truman’s advisors were 
providing him with estimates ranging from approximately 270,000 casualties to 
500,000, and even some estimates of one million. Truman was interviewed in 1951 
and the journalist recalled, “he asked what the population of Hiroshima was and his 
recollection was that the they said about 60,000. He said that it was far better to 
kill 60,000 Japanese than to have 250,000 Americans killed.” Truman’s comments 
clearly demonstrate that the atomic bomb could have been used against the 
Japanese as a consequence for this large loss of American lives in the war and to 
prevent further carnage with a planned invasion of the home islands.60 
In addition to the savagery of battle, Americans were horrified at the 
Japanese treatment of other peoples during the war. Americans were not yet fully 
aware of the atrocities of the Holocaust in Europe, but they were more informed of 
the Japanese Imperial Army’s actions. Reports of aerial bombing of Chinese 
civilians, and the shocking stories from the Rape of Nanking in 1937, among other 
tales, infuriated the American people. For example, “Japanese soldiers [were] 











up to the Marines,” after the United States military overpowered Japanese forces in 
Saipan in July 1944. Historian J. Samuel Walker notes “the graphic evidence of 
Japanese atrocities and inhumanity towards prisoners and civilians fed an image of 
an enemy that was cruel, barbarous, and deserving of annihilation,” like that which 
results from the destruction of an atomic bomb. These were reports of the actions of 
the Imperial Army, not the Japanese citizens as a whole. Nonetheless, the shock 
value of these reports likely made it easier to condemn the Japanese civilians with 
the order for the use of the atomic bomb.61 
In addition to the benefits of the use of the atomic bomb, it also provided a 
favorable alternative to collaborative invasion with the Soviet Union into Japan. 
America sentiments for the Soviet Union’s aid and involvement in the war against 
Japan began as early as December 10, 1941, a mere three days after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor and two days after the United States’ declaration of war. General 
Douglas MacArthur pressed “that every possible effort be made to obtain immediate 
entry of Russia into the war.” The sheer size of Russia’s military made them a 
valuable ally and formidable opponent. The expectation of Russian involvement 
continued throughout the following years, and was further reinforced at the Yalta 
Conference. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, President Franklin 
Roosevelt negotiated a separate secret agreement with Generalissimo Joseph 
Stalin. Stalin agreed to launch an invasion against Japan three months after 






Union received the Soviet land taken by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War in 
1904.62 
But beginning around the time of President Truman’s inauguration, the 
administration grew increasingly less interested in Soviet involvement in the 
Pacific. Military invasion plans that included Soviet involvement were still 
developed throughout the summer though. The overall plan was nicknamed 
Operation Downfall, but the operation was split into two key sects: Operations 
Olympic and Coronet. These plans mostly focused on the movements of the 
American forces but they were strategized on the expectation of Soviet assistance. 
The Soviet army was to launch an invasion into the Japanese holdings in China, 
drawing the bulk of the Japanese military efforts onto the mainland of Asia and 
away from the Japanese home islands. Shortly thereafter the American troops 
would begin their assault from the south. With the majority of the Japanese troops 
defending their Chinese claims from Soviet invasion, it would be significantly easier 
for the American forces to overcome the defenses of the main island. With a 
significant amount of Japanese forces pulled into Asia, the number of Japanese 
forces in battle would be less than American military leaders were anticipating in 
an invasion only involving Japan and the United States. It is unclear if there were 








But in the summer of 1945, attentions were diverted to the atomic bomb and 
all of the new complications and questions that came with it. At the Potsdam 
Conference in July 1945, Truman informed Stalin of the completion and successful 
testing of the atomic bomb. It is possible that Truman believed it was necessary to 
inform Stalin about the progress of the bomb because it would likely affect the 
Soviet’s intervention with Japan, and he was attempting to spark a renegotiation of 
previous secret negotiation at Yalta. Stalin was dismissive of the bomb, however, 
and the terms of the Soviet entrance into the Pacific remained the same.64 
On August 8, two days after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the Soviet 
Union declared war on Japan and launched their attack, on schedule as per the 
secret Yalta agreement. The bomb may have been dropped, though, with the goal of 
“keeping Russia out of any share in the Pacific victory, and of threatening Russia 
with our power in the postwar world.” It is possible that Truman may have been 
unsettled at the premise of Soviet intervention into Japan, in any capacity, and 
therefore uncomfortable or dissatisfied with the agreement that Roosevelt made 
with Stalin. While the United States and the Soviet Union were technically on the 
same side in World War II, the Soviet’s system of communism was disconcerting for 
the democratic capitalists of America. Expanding the Soviets’ sphere of interaction 
and influence could possibly be a catalyst for the expansion of communism, which 
directly conflicted with the United States’ interests. This was especially threatening 





end. The government was weak and crumbling, making it more susceptible to 
outside influence. And there was the possibility communism was an attractive 
solution to the political and economic difficulties facing the Japanese nation, which 
would have been a tragedy for the devout democratic capitalist United States. 
Dropping the bomb before extensive Soviet interference in Japan served dual 
purposes of bringing the war to an end more quickly and limiting the Soviets’ level 
of influence.65 
The timeline of events of the Pacific War provides considerable evidence in 
support of this conclusion. President Truman was well aware of the planned Soviet 
interference in Japan. Roosevelt and Stalin’s secretive Yalta Conference agreement 
stated that the Soviet Union would enter the war in the Pacific three months after 
Germany’s official surrender. Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, making the 
projected date for Soviet involvement August 8, 1945. It is remarkably suspicious 
that the atomic bomb was deployed on August 6, 1945, a mere two days before the 
agreed-upon Soviet entrance. This timing makes it abundantly clear the United 
States was committed to preventing the Soviet Union from entering Japan and 
exerting its influence, and that the atomic bomb was the tool chosen to achieve this 
end. While prevention of extensive Soviet influence in Japan was not a decisive 
factor in the choice to use the bomb, it was very clear a key factor in choosing when 







An equally viable reason for use of the atomic bomb could be that President 
Truman wanted to give the Soviet Union a display of the United States’ military 
power and technological advancement. At the Potsdam Conference, President 
Truman informed Stalin of the existence of America’s new atomic bomb. Truman 
recalled that Stalin did not seem overly interested. Stalin’s only remark was “he 
was glad to hear it and hoped we would make ‘good use of it against the Japanese.’” 
It is unclear how much information Stalin had regarding the new atomic weapon 
before the conversation with Truman, but more than likely, Stalin was already well 
informed of the new technological advancements, since there had been a number of 
Russian espionage scandals over the course of the Manhattan Project’s work. By 
being the first to make use of the new technology, though, the United States could 
display their dominance and technological superiority to threaten the Soviet Union, 
which set the stage for and ended up becoming a recurring theme in America’s Cold 
War interactions with the Soviets.67 
It seems to be a common theme throughout these suggested motives, 
however, that these were not the main goals in the use of the atomic bomb, but 
merely added bonuses. While these motives may have provided extra reasons to use 
the atomic bomb against Japan, none of these were the sole reason, or even 
significant factors in President Truman’s decision-making process. They were 





Truman was the prevention of American deaths in a direct invasion, which he 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed the world 
forever. Its groundbreaking weapons technology and strength shocked the world 
and has affected foreign policy and global interactions to this day. President Harry 
Truman made the fateful decision to use the bomb twice in a combat setting, swiftly 
bringing World War II to an end. The bomb was not Truman’s only option, however, 
as an invasion plan was being seriously organized. Additionally, ending the war 
swiftly may not have been Truman’s only motivating factor, since the Russians and 
the general brutality of the war may have been influential.  
 The United States became involved in World War II after Japan launched a 
surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. 
Throughout the war, American military efforts were torn between the war in the 
Pacific and the war in Europe. The United States had troops in both theaters but 
focused on defeating Germany first, and therefore prioritized the fight in Europe. 
Three and a half years later, in May 1945, Germany surrendered and the United 
States turned its full attention to defeating Japan in the Pacific. 
 In the early years of the war, President Franklin Roosevelt commissioned a 
top-secret project, named the Manhattan Project, to investigate and develop atomic 
energy and weaponry. This project was so secretive that many of the scientists were 
not told the complete purpose for their research. In April 1945, President Roosevelt 
passed away, though, leaving Vice President Harry Truman to lead the United 
States to victory in the war. Shortly after becoming president, Truman was 
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informed of the existence of the Manhattan Project and the details of the research. 
He then set about creating an advisory team to provide guidance through the 
critical decision of using the atomic bomb once it was completed. This advisory team 
included some Cabinet members, top military advisors, and a special panel of 
atomic scientists, called the Interim Committee. 
In addition to using the atomic bomb, Truman also seriously considered an 
invasion into the main islands of Japan. Since the atomic bomb had not been 
completely assembled and tested yet, launching an invasion into the Japanese 
homelands was essentially the default option. Therefore, Truman and his advisors 
spent much of the summer of 1945 discussing strategy and cost for the impending 
invasion. The Pacific War to that point had been incredibly bloody, a result of the 
American strategy of island hopping and the vicious fighting techniques of the 
Japanese military.  
Japanese culture fostered a savage Japanese military. In traditional 
Japanese culture, surrendering in battle was considered shameful. It was more 
honorable to die fighting than to return home having yielded to the enemy.  As a 
result, the battles in the Pacific were absolutely brutal, resulting in significant loss 
of life and property on both Japanese and American ends. This ferocity would likely 
only worsen the nearer the American military drew towards the core islands of 
Japan. Even with anticipated support from the Russian forces, launching an 
invasion would be incredibly costly, as multiple advisors forewarned President 
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Truman. While the exact casualty estimates provided Truman varied rather 
considerably, all estimates forecasted heavy American losses.  
But the threat of significant American casualties did not make the atomic 
bomb a sure thing. The atomic technology was brand new and Truman’s military 
and scientific advisors alike struggled with how exactly to implement the new 
bomb. Some advisors, such as Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, were skeptical that 
the new bomb should be used. Leahy was doubtful the bomb would be strong 
enough to affect any substantial damage that would facilitate a Japanese surrender, 
but he also held personal beliefs against large-scale bombings with regular bombs 
as well. Other advisors were supportive of using the atomic bomb, but there were 
differences amongst them in terms of how the bomb should be used. The majority of 
the Manhattan Project scientists believed Japan should be offered clear terms of 
surrender prior to the use of the bomb, if not multiple opportunities for surrender. 
But Secretary of War Henry Stimson was an advocate of full tactical use of the 
atomic bomb to bring the war to a rapid conclusion. All of these different opinions 
from his advisory committees had an effect on President Truman as he made his 
decision. 
On July 16, 1945, Manhattan Project engineers completed a successful test of 
the first atomic bomb at White Sands, New Mexico. When Truman was informed of 
this success, he was participating in the Potsdam Conference, meeting with 
Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin, to frame the post-war peace. Truman chose to 
inform Stalin of the new bomb, likely because of the upcoming Soviet involvement 
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in the Pacific War as outlined by the secret Yalta Agreement between Stalin and 
Roosevelt, but Stalin showed little excitement about the breakthrough, making only 
a comment about using it to end the war sooner. 
Following the completion of the bomb, the next decision was where to use it. 
General Leslie Groves commissioned the preexisting Target Committee to narrow 
down a list of targets for the new bomb. President Truman was very clear about his 
proclivity for using the bomb on a military target, and he removed Kyoto from the 
Target Committee’s reported list of targets, as he believed Kyoto was too significant 
to Japanese culture. Additionally, Kyoto was the ceremonial home of the Japanese 
Emperor, and such an attack on this sacred place would likely create more issues 
than solutions. The committee and Truman finally settled on Hiroshima, Kokura, 
Niigata and Nagasaki, in preference order for attack. 
In cooperation with the other world leaders at the Potsdam Conference, 
Truman issued the Potsdam Declaration to Japan. This declaration, issued on July 
26, 1945, warned Japan to surrender unconditionally or face utter destruction. This 
clearly threatened Japan, but without fully informing them of the new atomic 
technology or its capabilities. This document only outlined a few general terms of 
surrender, however, and the Japanese were unwilling to accept unconditional 
surrender, fearing they would be forced to abolish the role of the Emperor. Japan 
unofficially refused the Potsdam Declaration, and President Truman issued the 
order to deploy the atomic bomb shortly thereafter. 
	
	 55	
On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. 
The force of this bomb was greater than just about anyone anticipated, including 
the scientists that created it. The city was flattened, approximately 130,000 people 
were killed and over 220,000 more were injured. The sheer devastation left Japan 
reeling. Scrambling to aid their civilians, the Japanese government failed to send a 
surrender call to the United States. Therefore, three days after the Hiroshima 
attack, a second bomb was dropped, this time on Nagasaki, resulting in 70,000 
deaths and another 200,000 injuries. Following the second bomb, the Japanese 
government quickly submitted to surrender negotiations. After it was settled that 
Japan might keep their emperor, they agreed to officially surrender. The surrender 
ceremonies made the forfeit official on September 2, 1945. 
It was widely publicized that Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb was 
to prevent excessive loss of American lives in the event of an invasion. But there 
were additional factors that likely had at least a small influence on President 
Truman’s final decision. Preventing Russia from exerting significant influence over 
Japan was probably relevant to Truman, as was retribution for Pearl Harbor and 
generally displaying American technological superiority.  
Despite the fact that both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman anticipated and 
planned for Soviet involvement in the war in the Pacific, Russian interference in a 
weak and war-torn Japan was very far from ideal for the United States. Soviet 
assistance would have most likely eased the burden on the United States army, and 
made an invasion much easier, but the threat of the expansion of communism into 
	
	 56	
war-torn Japan was very nerve-wracking. It was probable that Truman utilized the 
bomb with strategic timing to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming too involved 
with vulnerable Japan. 
Additionally, the sheer brutality of the fighting with Japan, and the sneak 
attack on Pearl Harbor, may have influenced Truman. Faced with a savage army 
that committed atrocities against not only American civilians, but civilians of other 
nations as well, Truman may have found it much easier to condemn the people of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The loss of life for the ruthless Japanese over the loss of 
American life was a fairly clear choice. 
Historians may never know exactly why Truman made the choice he made. 
They may speculate about the invasion casualty rates or ulterior motives, but only 
President Truman will truly know why he chose to use the atomic bomb. Regardless 
of why it was utilized, the bomb has forever shaped interactions between nations. 
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